Thsi years random ****e from the CIA (probs fake :D) site

A Look Back ... Remembering the Cuban Missile Crisis

The Cuban Missile Crisis began on Oct. 16, 1962 -- the first of the "Thirteen Days of October." On that day, President John F. Kennedy was informed that a U-2 mission flown over western Cuba two days before had taken photographs of Soviet nuclear missile sites. The event was a watershed for the Intelligence Community (IC) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), in particular. It demonstrated that the technological collection capabilities so painstakingly constructed to monitor the Soviet Union had matured to give the IC an unmatched ability to provide policymakers with sophisticated warning and situational awareness.

Rumors of Nuclear Missile Deployment in Cuba

After the Soviet Union began supplying Cuba with conventional arms during the summer of 1960, rumors about a nuclear missile deployment on the island began emanating from Miami's Cuban émigré community. Despite an extensive array of assets targeted at Fidel Castro's regime, the IC could not substantiate the expatriates' reports. And not for a lack of trying: the CIA deployed collection teams and conducted technical operations; the US military's intelligence services and the FBI reached out to sources; the government had twice-a-month U-2 flights; the IC monitored official and nonofficial third country sources, travelers, and media reports. The IC concluded that the expatriates were trying to provoke the United States into taking military action against Castro.

Buildup

Sometime around April 1962, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev decided to develop Cuba into a nuclear base, and in mid-July Soviet shipments of conventional weapons and military equipment intensified. Throughout the summer, American policymakers and intelligence officials speculated about what the buildup meant. The IC concluded that Moscow's actions in Cuba were defensive, designed mainly to shore up a revolutionary ally while marginally improving its own political position in the region.
Director of Central Intelligence John McCone was virtually alone in assessing that the Kremlin had more malevolent intentions: the buildup was a prelude to the deployment of nuclear missiles. McCone believed that Khrushchev was trying to overcome US strategic superiority and extort diplomatic concessions by establishing a nuclear outpost near the United States.
Even after Soviet surface-to-air missile sites were detected in late August -- the first time such weapons had been seen outside Soviet-controlled territory -- McCone's judgment sounded like a worst-case scenario at best, an unfounded hunch at worst, and might have been discounted somewhat because of his widely known, visceral distrust of the Soviet Union.
The DCI found his case even harder to make because of headline-grabbing allegations by Kenneth Keating, a Republican Senator from New York, an ardent critic of the Administration's policy toward Castro, and a friend of McCone's. Keating's alarmist assertions provided fodder for GOP candidates in the Congressional campaigns then getting underway and inclined Administration officials to discount intelligence that tended to corroborate them. Some officials even suspected that McCone was secretly collaborating in the Senator's disclosures to force the White House to take strong action against Cuba.

The U-2: High-level Aerial Reconnaissance

The intelligence picture was complicated further when the best source of information on Soviet military activity in Cuba -- high-level aerial reconnaissance -- was curtailed at a crucial time for diplomatic reasons. In mid-September the Kennedy Administration placed restrictions on US Air Force U-2 flights over Cuba after the Communist Chinese shot down a U-2 over the mainland and the Soviets protested an accidental U-2 overflight of Sakhalin Island.
The restrictions limited aerial reconnaissance over Cuba to a few peripheral and in-and-out flights by CIA-piloted U-2s. Other intelligence -- such as refugee and agent reports, intercepted communications, and shipping information -- could not fill the gap. Unbeknownst to anyone in Washington, the first Soviet Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs) arrived at the port of Mariel on Sept. 15, 1962.
In early October, the National Security Council's Special Group relaxed the restrictions on U-2 flights after receiving more reliable HUMINT reports about suspicious Soviet activities in western Cuba. Bad weather and bureaucratic delay kept the first Air Force-piloted U-2 mission under the new reconnaissance schedule from being flown until Oct. 14. The flight crossed the island and brought back photographs of what analysts at the National Photographic Interpretation Center determined were three MRBM launch sites near San Cristobal.
The Deputy Director for Intelligence at CIA, Ray Cline, passed the momentous news to the President's National Security Adviser, McGeorge Bundy, on the evening of Oct. 15. Bundy told President Kennedy the following morning. Speaking over an open line early on the 16th, the DCI's executive assistant, Walter Elder, told McCone, "That which you and you alone said would happen, has happened."

Managing the Crisis

To help him manage the crisis, President Kennedy set up a working group within the National Security Council called the Executive Committee, better known as the ExComm. McCone was the only member from an intelligence agency. During the “Thirteen Days,” he attended more than two dozen meetings to deal with specific issues. For him and his colleagues, this episode probably was the most grueling of their careers -- a frantic marathon of 16-hour-plus workdays filled with urgent discussions and telephone calls; hurried limousine trips, briefings and corridor conferences; catnaps in the office and meals on the run; political frustrations and bureaucratic wrangles; and social commitments that had to be kept to avoid arousing suspicion that something dire was afoot.
The DCI and several assistants -- DDI Cline, NPIC director Arthur Lundahl, and chief science analyst Sidney Graybeal -- translated the arcana of strategic weapons intelligence and U-2 photography at regular briefings to the President and the ExComm. A vital part of the information they considered came from a Soviet military intelligence officer, Oleg Penkovsky. During the previous two years, Penkovsky had provided to the United States and Great Britain technical specifications about Soviet nuclear missiles--their range and destructive power, and how long they took to become operational after they were shipped to a given location. That last bit of intelligence persuaded Kennedy that he did not need to order air strikes to take out the missile sites immediately and instead had a brief time to pursue a diplomatic settlement.
By Oct. 20, the ExComm had reached a consensus in favor of a naval "quarantine" on Soviet military shipments to Cuba as a tactic to force Khrushchev's hand. McCone at first favored immediate air strikes but soon agreed that a quarantine -- combined with a deadline for withdrawing the missiles -- was the best option. The president announced the presence of the missiles and the imposition of the quarantine to the world in a television address on the evening of Oct. 22.
After six more nerve-wracking days, Khrushchev backed down and agreed to withdraw all the missiles and launch equipment. During those six days, all 24 MRBM launchers became operational, construction on several intermediate range missile sites proceeded rapidly, and sensitive back-channel talks took place between the Soviet ambassador and Attorney General Robert Kennedy.
In exchange for the withdrawal, Washington agreed not to invade Cuba and, several months later, to withdraw obsolete nuclear-tipped missiles from Turkey. Because Castro ultimately refused to allow the agreed-upon on-site inspections, Kennedy later revoked his non-invasion pledge.
For the next several months, the IC monitored Moscow's compliance through all-source collection against a wide range of Soviet and Cuban targets. By early February 1963, IC agencies concluded that the Soviets had withdrawn all strategic weapons and support personnel from Cuba and dismantled the missile sites.
















More random ****e







Clandestine Service

The threats facing the United States today are more complex and challenging than ever before, and the collection of foreign intelligence has never been more vital to our nation's security. Some of the broad issues we face, such as the threat of war and regional instability are perennial challenges. CompIex targets such as terrorism and proliferation pose increasingly critical threats.
In this environment, the National Clandestine Service (NCS) operates as the clandestine arm of the CIA, and serves as the national authority for the coordination, deconfliction, and evaluation of clandestine human intelligence operations across the Intelligence Community. The NCS supports our country's security and foreign policy interests by conducting clandestine activities to collect information that is not obtainable through other means. The NCS also conducts counterintelligence and special activities as authorized by the President.




Ditto




Support to Mission

In CIA's unique environment, support to our intelligence collectors and to our analysts must be focused, agile, integrated, and 100 percent reliable.
The Support to Mission team provides that mission-focused support to the CIA through a full range of support services. We build and operate facilities; we ensure robust, secure communications over multiple networks, connecting officers sitting in dispersed locations; we acquire and ship a full range of critical equipment; we secure our building, our people, our data, and our networks; we help hire, train, and assign CIA officers for every directorate; we manage the "businesses" within CIA--contracts and acquisitions, financial services, administrative support, and even our own phone company. We do everything we can to ensure that our officers serving around the world are safe, secure, and healthy.
Within the Directorate of Support, we have deep expertise and extraordinary breadth. We serve globally side-by-side with our mission partners from the Directorate of Intelligence, the Directorate of Science & Technology and the National Clandestine Service, ensuring they have the support they need to succeed.
We invite you to explore the many employment opportunities available to you, both within the Agency and across the Intelligence Community, as a vital member of our extraordinary team.





YAY MORE RANDOM ****E






Life in the DS

Careers

Over the course of your career as a support officer, you will have the opportunity to serve in a variety of locations and an assortment of positions. You will be invited to enhance your skills either by carrying out progressively more challenging duties within an area of specialization, or by building on your experience and contacts to coordinate support activities across the board for your particular audience.
Support officers generally serve alongside their customers, rotating to a new office or location every few years in line with their interests and increased experience. Career opportunities for Directorate of Support officers are reflective of the complex array of duties and support requirements that exist across the Agency and the Intelligence Community.

Training Resources

The Agency is committed to providing its employees with all the appropriate skills needed to carry out their current jobs as well as to advance their careers within the Agency. Employees have access to a wide range of both internal courses and local academic offerings.
Building on several courses that introduce all new employees to the overall Agency environment and culture, the Hank Mahoney Support College (HMSC) was recently established to provide focused training for specialties in the support arena. As an initial step, several existing components which offer specialized training focused primarily on security, information technology and administrative skills were consolidated under the HMSC umbrella. HMSC leadership, in cooperation with a range of outside advisors, is working to expand the course offerings in line with the evolving challenges of support officers.









Ya know... I jsut dont I dont get american agents knocking at meh door...



Why have I started posting careers stuff?




Scientists, Engineers & Technology - View Jobs

Technology so advanced, it’s classified.

In today’s world of ever-changing challenges, it is more important than ever for the CIA to stay ahead of fast-paced global technology developments. The classified work we are presently undertaking allows us to meet the Agency’s foreign intelligence mission through leadership in a wide range of scientific and technical disciplines. This is truly a unique opportunity for scientific and engineering experts to look beyond a commercial, product-driven mindset to goal-oriented, highly focused work of significant national importance.



Scientists & Engineers

College Students - Scientists, Engineers & Technology
Electrical Engineer
Materials Engineer
Mechanical Engineer
Program Management Engineer
Research Scientist
Science, Technology, and Weapons Analyst
Security Engineer
Systems Engineer
Technical Operations Officer
Technical Security Officers
Technical/Targeting Analyst

Information Technology

College Students - Support Services
Customer Service & Information Technology Officer - Entry Level
Customer Service & Information Technology Officer - Full Performance
Engineering Specialist
Enterprise Systems Engineer
Information System Security Officer
Network Design and Management
Network Engineer - Developmental
Network Engineer - Full Performance
Program Manager for IT
Server Operations Specialist
Software Systems Specialist
Tactical Communications Specialists
Telecommunications Information Systems Officers

Occupational Medicine & Psychological Services

Clinical Psychologist
Medical Officer
Occupational Health Nurse
Operational Psychologist
Physician Assistant
Psychometrist
Research Psychologist










some other stuff


Strategic Intent 2007-2011

Director's Message

This Strategic Intent, which benefited greatly from [employee] comments and suggestions, is our roadmap for the next five years. It will enable us to become a more effective organization in fulfilling our paramount mission: protecting the American people. Its central theme is integration—operating as a team within our Agency and with our Community colleagues. We must combine our talents according to what the mission requires. Our common culture will be One Agency, One Community.​

This Intent is fully consistent with both the President's National Security Strategy and the DNI's National Intelligence Strategy, which call for the nation's intelligence enterprise to become “more unified, coordinated and effective.”​

I am excited about this Intent because of the promise it holds for our Agency. As we better integrate our core capabilities—and as we take steps to strengthen those capabilities—we will meet the demands placed on us by the challenging strategic environment that our country faces.
As we meet our strategic goals, we will be true to our core values: Service, Integrity, and Excellence. They are the constants that reflect the best of our Agency's unique history and accomplishments. These are the values that have served us well and will guide us as we embark on making our Strategic Intent a reality.

/sig/
Gen. Michael V. Hayden
Director, Central Intelligence Agency

Strategic Intent 2007-2011 [PDF 544KB*]​

Vision

One Agency. One Community. An Agency unmatched in its core capabilities, functioning as one team, fully integrated into the Intelligence Community.

The Mission

We are the nation's first line of defense. We accomplish what others cannot accomplish and go where others cannot go. We carry out our mission by:

• Collecting information that reveals the plans, intentions and capabilities of our adversaries and provides the basis for decision and action.
• Producing timely analysis that provides insight, warning and opportunity to the President and decisionmakers charged with protecting and advancing America's interests.
• Conducting covert action at the direction of the President to preempt threats or achieve US policy objectives.

Core Values

• Service. We put Country first and Agency before self. Quiet patriotism is our hallmark. We are dedicated to the mission, and we pride ourselves on our extraordinary responsiveness to the needs of our customers.
• Integrity. We uphold the highest standards of conduct. We seek and speak the truth—to our colleagues and to our customers. We honor those Agency officers who have come before us and we honor the colleagues with whom we work today.
• Excellence. We hold ourselves—and each other—to the highest standards. We embrace personal accountability. We reflect on our performance and learn from that reflection.

The Strategic Environment

We operate in an unstable and dangerous world where international terrorism, the rise of new powers, and the accelerating pace of economic and technological change will place enormous strains on the ability of states to govern and will sharply increase the potential for strategic surprises.

• Our adversaries in the long war on terrorism are dispersed across the globe; they are resilient, ruthless, patient and committed to the mass murder of our citizens.
• The possession and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction threatens international stability and the safety of our homeland.
• The rise of China and India and the emergence of new economic “centers” will transform the geopolitical and economic landscape.
• Weak governments, lagging economies, competition for resources, and youth bulges will create crises in many regions.

The Nation's Expectations

The American people look to us as never before. The bar has been set very high and appropriately so. They look to us to protect their way of life, to be dedicated to the security of the United States, and to uphold and defend the Constitution. They expect our nation's leaders to hold us accountable. They expect that in pursuit of our mission we will take risks and honor the very national values we seek to protect. They expect us to keep secrets but not have anything to hide. They expect us to work with integrity and speak truth to power.

Our Goals




1. Integrating Intelligence Capabilities

1.1 Align mission, activities, and capabilities with the National Intelligence Strategy.​

1.2 Create an environment for effective collaboration within CIA.​

1.3 Continually seek expanded opportunities for partnering with the national security community.​

1.4 Broaden and deepen ties with foreign partners to enhance mission performance.​

1.5 Strengthen our ability to systematically capture and share lessons learned from our intelligence successes and failures.​

2. Fulfilling a Leadership Role in the Intelligence Community

2.1 Build an integrated national HUMINT service and enhance the Intelligence Community's relationship with foreign intelligence services.​

2.2 Lead the integrated center dedicated to the highest quality collection, analysis and dissemination of open source materials.​

2.3 Pioneer innovative, all-source analytical methods that can be adopted across the IC.​

3. Strengthening Core Capabilities

3.1 Expand and deepen expertise across all mission areas.​

3.2 Develop and deploy innovative ways to penetrate the toughest targets.​

3.3 Continue to enhance analytic tradecraft, strengthen strategic analysis, and expand analytic outreach.​

3.4 Improve global coverage to enhance our ability to anticipate and respond to emerging challenges and opportunities.​

3.5 Develop more robust and agile covert action capabilities.​

3.6 Advance mission through the development, introduction, and application of innovative technologies, leveraging advances made elsewhere in the Intelligence Community, US Government and industry.​

4. Investing in Our People

4.1 Develop and sustain an Agency-wide culture—One Team, One Set of Values—where goals are mutually shared and honored.​

4.2 Align the rewards and incentives programs to support the goals of this Strategic Intent—becoming an organization that encourages and rewards mission contributions in traditional and non-traditional assignments.​

4.3 Recruit, develop, and retain exceptional individuals from a diverse talent pool.​

4.4 Develop Agency leaders with the skills and abilities necessary to promote more effective Agency performance and contributing to cross-cutting Intelligence Community objectives.​

4.5 Enhance employee health, safety, and quality of life to create an environment that enables people to work more effectively.​

5. Creating a 21st Century Infrastructure

5.1 Improve IT infrastructure both to integrate more effectively our capabilities and to service an increasingly dispersed workforce.​

5.2 Modernize and expand our physical infrastructure to meet the needs of a growing workforce.​

5.3 Ensure CIA's ability to continue essential operations even under adverse circumstances by expanding our distributed mission capabilities.​

Axel_8 is actually reading this xDDD​

Leadership

Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency is General Michael V. Hayden, USAF. The D/CIA serves as the head of the Central Intelligence Agency and reports to the Director of National Intelligence. The D/CIA is nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The Director manages the operations, personnel and budget of the CIA and acts as the National Human Source Intelligence (HUMINT) Manager.

Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
The Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency is Stephen R. Kappes. The DD/CIA assists the Director in his duties as head of the CIA and exercises the powers of the Director when the Director’s position is vacant or in the Director’s absence or disability.


Associate Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
The Associate Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, a position created July 5, 2006, was delegated all authorities and responsibilities vested previously in the post of Executive Director. The post of Executive Director, which was responsible for managing the CIA on a day-to-day basis, was simultaneously abolished. The current, and first, Associate Deputy Director is Michael J. Morell.

Director of Intelligence
The Directorate of Intelligence,the analytical branch of the CIA, is responsible for the production and dissemination of all-source intelligence analysis on key foreign issues. The current director is John A. Kringen.

Director of the National Clandestine Service
The National Clandestine Service is responsible for the clandestine collection of foreign intelligence. The current director is Michael Sulick.

Director of Science & Technology
The Directorate of Science and Technology creates and applies innovative technology in support of the intelligence collection mission. The current director is Stephanie L. O’Sullivan.

Director of Support
The Directorate of Support provides the mission critical elements of the Agency's support foundation: people, security, information, property, and financial operations. The current director is Scott White.

Director of the Center for the Study of Intelligence
The Center for the Study of Intelligence maintains the Agency's historical materials and promotes the study of intelligence as a legitimate and serious discipline. The current director is Carmen A. Medina.

General Counsel
The Office of General Counsel advises the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency on all legal matters relating to his role as CIA director and is the principal source of legal counsel for the CIA. The current Acting General Counsel is John A. Rizzo.

Director of Public Affairs
The Office of Public Affairs advises the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency on all media, public policy, and employee communications issues relating to his role as CIA director and is the CIA’s principal communications focal point for the media, the general public and Agency employees. The current Director of Public Affairs is Mark Mansfield.

NoFEAR Act

NoFEAR Act of 2002


On May 15, 2002, President Bush signed the Notification and Federal Employee Anti-discrimination and Retaliation Act of 2002 (NoFEAR Act) into law. The NoFEAR Act, with an effective date of October 1, 2003, requires Federal agencies to be accountable for violations of anti-discrimination laws.
Section 301 of the NoFEAR Act requires each agency to post quarterly on its public Web site certain summary statistical data relating to equal employment opportunity complaints filed against them under 29 C.F.R Part 1614.
The US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) issued rules regarding posting of Equal Employment Opportunity complaint processing data. Those rules include posting summary statistics for the current fiscal year on a cumulative (year-to-date) quarterly basis and statistics for each of the preceding five years.
Click here to view the NoFEAR Act Notice.
The pages linked below contain the information required by the NoFEAR Act and EEOC rules.


Iraqi Rewards Program

برنامج مكافآت العراق

اذا كان في حوزتك أية معلومات التي تعتقد بأنها مهمة بالنسبة لحكومة الولايات المتحدة، الرجاء الاتصال بنا عن طريق إكمال النموذج المعروض على موقعنا المؤمن.

ومن جهتنا نحن نصون بعناية جميع المعلومات التي تزودنا بها بما في ذلك هويتك. ومن اجل مساعدتنا للتأكد من معلوماتك والعمل بسرعة عليها يجب عليك تزويدنا بإسمك الكامل، وجنسيتك، ومهنتك ومعلومات عن كيفية الإتصال بك، بما فيها رقم هاتفك. وهذا مما يخوّل حكومة الولايات المتحدة منح مكافآت مقابل المعلومات القيّمة وسوف نحافظ على السرية التامة.
الهجمات الوشيكة: اذا كان في حوزتك معلومات تتعلق بهجوم وشيك من قبل المتمردين او الارهابيين ضد المدنيين أو عن البنية التحتية أو الاماكن العامة أو مصالح الولايات المتحدة، نطلب منك أن تفيد بهذه المعلومات فوراًً من خلال هذا النموذج المعروض على موقعنا المؤمن بالإضافة إلى إبلاغ قوات الشرطة المحلية.
التطرف العنيف والارهاب: تريد حكومة الولايات المتحدة أن تدعم السلام والإستقرار في جميع أنحاء العالم. فإن المنظمات التي تعزز وتستخدم الإرهاب كأداة لتحقيق مآربها والمتطرفين الذين يلجأون للعنف بالإضافة إلى هؤلاء الذين يدعمون النشاطات العنف كلهم يريدون تقويض مستقبل بلدكم. إن المكافآت متوفرة مقابل معلومات محددة والتي يمكن التحقق من صحتها والتي تساعد على إلقاء القبض او حرمان الإرهابيين من الملاذ والتأييد، مثل معلومات عن:

• القاعدة، وأنصار السنّة، وأنصار الإسلام بالإضافة إلى منظمات إرهابية أخرى وأتباعهم
• الافراد أو الجماعات الذين يحصلون على متفجرات و أسلحة أخرى لإستخدامها ضد المدنيين أو أهداف حكومية
• الأفراد أو الجماعات المتورطة في التفجيرات (شراْالقطع،البناء، الإستهداف أو التجنيد)
• الأفراد أو الجماعات الذين يوفرون أو يبيعون مواد للمتطرفين والجماعات الإرهابية
• المواقع التي تجمّع فيها المواد التي تستخدم لتصنيع المتفجرات
• الافراد او الجماعات الذين يوفرون للمتطرفين وللارهابيين ملاجىء آمنة وتدريب ومساعدات لوجستية
• الافراد او الجماعات المتورطين في طرق تهريب الارهابيين او على علم بتلك الطرق
• الافراد او الجماعات الذين يجنّدون ويسهّلون ويجمعون التبرعات ويقومون بأي عمل لمساندة الارهاب
• الافراد الذين يزوّدون الارهابيين بوثائق لتسهيل تنقلاتهم بين الدول
• وكالات ومكاتب السفريات والمنظمات الغير حكومية والواجهات المتورطة في تسهيل سفريات الارهابيين بين الدول
• الأشخاص أو المنظمات المتورطة في تصنيع الاسلحة والذخيرة والمتفجرات والمعدات التي يمكن إستخدامها في المتفجرات

أشخاص ذو أهمية قصوة: تُمنح مكافآت للأشخاص الذين يوفرون معلومات التي قد تستخدم مباشرةً للقبض على قادة المتطرفين والمنظمات الإرهابية. تُمنح مكافآة خاصة بقيمة 25 مليون دولار أمريكي للقبض على أسامة بن لادن ومكافآة قد تصل إلى 10 مليون دولار أمريكي للقبض على القائد عزة الدوري من النظام العراقي السابق. هذه المعلومات قد تتضمن ولكن ليست مقتصرة على التالي:

• المكان الحالي و نشاطات هؤلاء الاشخاص
• مع من يتقابل هؤلاء الاشخاص وما هي مخططاتهم المستقبلية
• البنية التحتية الداعمة لهؤلاء الاشخاص من ضمنها مصادر التمويل
• الاشخاص الذين يدعمون أو يساعدون هؤلاء الاشخاص

منع إنتشار الاسلحة: تُمنح مكافآت للأشخاص الذين يوفرون معلومات محددة التي يمكن التحقق من صحتها والتي تساعد على منع إنتشار الاسلحة وقدرات إنتاجها للمتطرفين والمنظمات الإرهابية. تُمنح مكافآت للمعلومات المحددة التي يمكن التأكد من صحتها عن:

• مواقع تخزين المواد المستخدمة في تركيب هذه الاسلحة
• معلومات عن أشخاص أو جماعات متورطة في تهريب هذه الاسلحة وتجهيزاتها
• شحنات غير عادية تتضمن معدات تقنية عالية والتي قد تستخدم في تصنيع وإنتاج هذه الاسلحة

أعضاء قوات التحالف المفقودين: تُمنح مكافآت للأشخاص الذين يوفرون معلومات عن قوات التحالف العسكرية المفقودين وبما فيه الطيار في القوات البحرية الامريكية مايكل سبايكر.